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THE FAULT PIT
David G. Owen*
Fault lies at the heart of tort law, the private law of wrongs.1
This concept, simple yet profound, always has been true and prob-
ably always will. In the early history of the law, the public law of
crimes usually dwarfed in practical significance the private law of
harms Yet within the civil law, fault and legal responsibility for
harm have lain together through the mists of time, inextricably in-
tertwined, bound one unto the other.3
As societies have imposed upon themselves across the ages the
civilizing restraints of law, they have often moved in fits and starts,
sometimes erring in the process. Thus it is that the role of fault,
from time to time in the history of the law, has sometimes waned.
So, for example, as the law of accidents sought identity in
America's early years of nationhood, fault had to struggle hard to
free itself from dormancy in centuries of frozen doctrine to its nat-
ural position at the center of the law. It was not until 1850, in
Brown v. Kendal,4 that Chief Judge Shaw officially pronounced
the dominant position of fault in the law of accidents. For the cen-
tury that followed, fault reigned supreme as the ruling concept in
the law of torts.5
* Webster Professor of Tort Law, University of South Carolina. I am grateful to Oxford
University (Corpus Christi and University Colleges) for support during the preparation of
this essay. Patrick Hubbard, who was across the Atlantic while this essay was in progress,
provided very little help.
I "Tort," from the French word for injury or wrong, derived originally from the Latin
"tortus," meaning twisted or crooked. W. PAGE KEETON. DAN B. DOBBS. RoER . KEEroN.
& DAVID G. OWE-N, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TorS (none of this "et al" rub-
bish) § I (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON ToRs].
I See id. § 2.
3 See generally OLIVR WENDELL HOLMES, JR. THE COMION LAw 2-5, 88-107 (1881); Na-
than Issacs, Fault and Liability: Two Views of Legal Development, 31 HAnv. L. Ray. 954,
965-66 (1918); Percy H. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 LQ. Rav. 37, 37-38
(1926).
4 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
' Holmes was undoubtedly correct, in 1881, in asserting that "the law does, in general,
determine liability by blameworthiness." HOLMES, supra note 3, at 108. The transformation
of tort law's basis of liability in the nineteenth century to an explicitly fault-based moral
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About 1950, more or less, some well-meaning but misguided re-
formers began to challenge the supremacy of fault in the law of
accidents. Within about a decade, by about 1960, some of their
dissident ideas had begun to seep into the law.7 And by the 1970s,
the dominance of fault in the law of torts was being challenged on
many fronts-as-its nemesis, strict liability, rapidly gained schol-
arly support and doctrinal ground. As the twentieth century closes
its doors, however, fault is once again reasserting its sovereign role
in the law of torts.
In hindsight, the law's infatuation in recent decades with a rule
of strict liability, in opposition to a rule of fault or negligence, is
now beginning to take on an air of quaintness, reflecting the exu-
berant excesses of youth. From the vantage point of the law's ma-
turity, gained by its awkward, fitful, and ultimately unsuccessful
effort to make sense out of a broad doctrine of strict products lia-
bility, fault's true position at the center of tort law is becoming
clearer by the day.
The most valuable chronicling of the history of tort law in
America has emerged from the computer of Gary Schwartz. In his
prior writings, he substantially enriched our understanding of the
development of both early and recent tort law in this nation.8 In
his current article, The Beginning and Possible End of The Rise of
Modern American Tort Law,9 Professor Schwartz provides a his-
tory of recent tort law that is a lush mosaic of description and ex-
standard was greeted with considerable approval by the commentators. "The ethical stan-
dard of reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard of acting at one's peril."
James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1907).
' For example, Fleming James, Charles Gregory, and Albert Ehrenzweig. See ALBERT A,
EHRENzWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1422 (1966);
Fleming James, Jr., General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negli-
gence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951).
" Notably, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). See George
L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985), elegantly critiqued in
David G. Owen, The Intellectual Development of Modern Products Liability Law: A Com-
ment on Priest's View of the Cathedral's Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 529 (1985).
' E.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV.
641 (1989); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America:
A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence
and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Vitality].
1 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).
704 [Vol. 26:703
FAULT PIT
planation. The literature on American tort law history contains
some valuable analyses of certain of its "intellectual" contours,"0
but Professor Schwartz's current article presents the clearest vision
to date of the variety of factors that have combined to generate the
dramatic developments in tort law since 1960.
There is little of substance with which to quarrel in Professor
Schwartz's careful and rich portrayal of recent tort law history. My
purpose here, instead, is to add a bit of decoration to his account
of tort law history, and to provide it moral depth. The decorative
function of my essay is accomplished through the presentation and
explanation of two graphic drawings which illustrate the growth
and permanence of fault in tort law history. The moral depth is
provided by a brief discussion of moral theory which may help ex-
plain at once the failure of the Great Strict Liability Experiment
and the inevitability of tort law's return to fault as its central
ethic.
I. FAULT IN TORT LAW HISTORY
Fault has always been the driving force within the law of wrong-
ful harms, as discussed above. Yet the role of fault in legal doctrine
has varied over time. In accident law, the prominence of fault is
largely coincident with the rise of the law of negligence, which has
been the principal basis of liability in America during the 1900s.
This does not mean of course that negligence law in particular or
tort law in general have remained stagnant throughout the cen-
tury, for much the opposite is true. Indeed, this century has wit-
nessed considerable growth in negligence doctrine and liability,
strict liability doctrine, and tort liability in general, as illustrated
below in Figure 1.






Figure 1 illustrates-conceptually rather than arithmeti-
cally-the growth of tort liability and doctrine over time. Develop-
ments from 1900 to the present are represented by the solid
curves, and by the darker shaded areas below the curves; the bro-
ken curves and more lightly shaded areas to the right represent
predicted paths of future liability and doctrine. The lower thin
curve represents negligence liability, and the upper curve-heavy
on the left and thin on the right-represents strict liability doc-
trine. The heavy, dark curve running directly above (and nearly
parallel to) the negligence liability line represents total tort liabil-
ity,11 including the sum of both strict and fault-based liability.
Liability based on fault or negligence began the century at a
fairly low level. This is not because fault was not then accepted as
the principal determinant of liability, but because of the existence
at the time of a large number of protective rules of "immunity"1
" This curve represents total tort liability for accidents. Thus, liability for intentional
torts is excluded from this figure.
22 1 use the term here in its ordinary, general sense, rather than in its formal, narrow




shielding defendants from legal responsibility for the consequences
of their negligence."3 For example, negligent manufacturers of de-
fective products were generally protected by the privity rule of
Winterbottom v. Wright,14 at least until Benjamin Cardozo over-
turned the doctrine in New York in 1916.15 Leaders in soci-
ety-public officials, business managers, and professionals (and
their institutions)-were subjected to liability, if at all, only for the
most blatant forms of fault. And contributory negligence barred
even slightly careless plaintiffs from recovering against defendants
substantially at fault. 6
The rising slope of negligence liability, portrayed in Figure 1, re-
flects the breakdown in such immunities as the century progressed,
and as fault was freed to perform its appointed tasks. Fault's most
dramatic liberation occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, and to some
extent thereafter, as courts (and sometimes legislatures) released
the tort of negligence from a variety of restrictive rules that immu-
nized many types of actors-manufacturers, landowners, lawyers,
doctors, governments, charities, and family members-against legal
responsibility for niany types of harm-from ordinary personal in-
jury to mental anguish of various types, economic loss, and fla-
grantly inflicted harm."
The slope of the negligence liability curve begins to level off
rather markedly during the 1980s, until it becomes nearly flat by
1990 and beyond. This is not to indicate that negligence liability
has stopped expanding in all respects, for new instances of liabil-
ity-new types of wrongs and new types of wrongdoers-surely will
continue to arise as developments in society accelerate in new di-
rections in the future. But Professor Schwartz surely is right in
concluding that the period of vast growth for negligence law is
Is See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinter-
pretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981).
14 10 M. & NV. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
1 The case was MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). See gener-
ally W. PAGE KErrON, DAVID G. OWEN. JOHN . MoNTcomERY. & MICHAEL D. GmNs. PaOD-
ucrs LiLn-.rry AD SAFETY-CAsES AND TERuAs 39-52 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter PROD-
ucTs LiAEmrrY AN SAFry] (examining the MacPherson case).
16 That is, until comparative fault finally began to gain a substantial foothold in this na-
tion in the 1960s. See PROSSER AND KEET ON ow TOrS, supra note 1, § 67.
1 That may give rise, in the latter instance, to punitive damages. On the moral dimen-
sions of such damages, see David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages,
40 ALA. L REV. 705 (1989).
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over,"a that we have already witnessed the full flowering of fault, in
all its splendor.19
In the years ahead, as in the recent past, negligence law should
be expected to expand only incrementally. Importantly, parts of it
will sometimes actually contract, as ,various areas of negligence re-
sponsibility are found unacceptable because they prove unfair or
inefficient in application. Whether the net advance of the negli-
gence curve in future years will remain slightly upward, will be-
come flat, or will trend downward depends upon factors that are
very difficult to predict, such as people's attitudes-on personal
and corporate responsibility, private insurance and social welfare
programs, and the use of courts for allocating accident costs-and
upon the nation's economic health.2 0
Strict liability, shown in Figure 1 in the dotted area between the
negligence liability curve and the total tort liability curve above, is
portrayed as growing almost imperceptively until the 1960s and
1970s, when it begins a modest upward climb. If the graph in Fig-
ure I contained a separate curve for strict liability, which it does
not, it" would be represented by a straight line, almost horizontal,
toward the very bottom of the figure. From the lower left, it would
rise only slightly toward the right, representing the area captured
between the lower and middle curves. Thus, strict liability, as such,
piggybacks upon the negligence liability curve in Figure 1 to gener-
ate the aggregate heavy curve of total tort liability-which repre-
sents the sum of negligence liability plus strict liability.
The top curve, representing strict liability doctrine, runs coinci-
dentally with the total tort liability curve until the 1960s, when its
slope increases sharply; then, in the 1980s, it peaks and begins to
18 Schwartz, supra note 9.
" "[TIhe tort liability explosion of the last quarter-century has been very closely tied to
changes in the law that have increasingly enabled the negligence principle to expand to its
full capacity." Schwartz, Vitality, supra note 8, at 969.
20 Together with the not unrelated question of the extent of public and private health
care and disability insurance coverage throughout society. Although the availability of af-
fordable health care (and, to a lesser extent, disability) insurance is important to the devel-
opment of tort law only indirectly, its potential significance is substantial. This is because
the willingness of people to consent to a regime that limits responsibility for accidents to
negligence depends in part on their belief in an important premise: that a broad first-party
accident insurance system, undergirded by a social welfare net, is fairer and cheaper (i.e.,
consumes fewer personal and social resources) than the third-party insurance mechanism of
a strict liability tort-law system.
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fall. The curve is described in terms of "doctrine" rather than "lia-
bility" to distinguish the rule or doctrine of products liability, be-ginning in the 1960s, that purports to impose "strict" liability but
does not really. Prior to the 1960s, strict liability and its doctrine
tracked together, because the very limited rules of liability for wildanimals and ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activities
generally were applied by the courts in a meaningful, restrictive
fashion. From the early 1960s, for about two decades, the doctrine
of strict liability in tort for defective products-not unlike crab-
grass-sprouted, spread, and appeared to flourish in the sunshine
of an expanding law of torts and consumer rights. But the doc-
trine's shallow analytical roots proved incapable of providing en-
during sustenance, and the doctrine began to wither in the 1980s.
21
The immediate judicial origins of this decline may be traced to
the New Jersey Supreme Court's remarkable repudiation, in the
, Many commentators have examined the substantial failures of the strict products lia-
bility doctrine. "Early" articles on the weaknesses of strict products liability theory include
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to War-
ranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L Rav. 593 (1980); Richard A. Epstein,
Products Liability: The Gathering Storm, REG., Sept/Oct. 1977, at 15; Richard A. Epstein,
Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. Ra. 643 (1978); James A.
Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
of Adjudication, 73 COLUM L. RaV. 1531 (1973); Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liabil-
ity Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153 (1976); O.E. Lange, Compensation of Vic-
tims-A Pious and Misleading Platitude, 54 CALF. L Rav. 1559 (1966); David G. Owen,
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. Rav. 681 (1980) [hereinaf-
tar Owen, Rethinking the Policies]; Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for
Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TEam L. REv. 938 (1957);
William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tax. L REv. 777
(1983); Richard E. Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability
Under the Unifor Commercial Code, 51 VA. L Rav. 804 (1965).
Helpful, recent treatments of some of the practical and conceptual problems with the
doctrine of strict products liability include James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.
L. Rsv. 265 .(1990); William C. Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products
Liability, 1991 U. IL L. REv. 639 [hereinafter Powers, Modest Proposal]; and Alan
Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 819 (1992) [hereinafter A.
Schwartz, Case Against Strict Liability]. On some of the moral problems with the doctrine,
see David G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st Century, 11 PACE
L. REv. 63 (1990) [hereinafter Owen, Principles of Justice]; David G. Owen, The Moral
Foundations of Products Liability Law. Toward First Principles (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Georgia Law Review) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations]. A particu-
larly illuminating essay on problems with the general notion of strict liability is Stephen R.
Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CANADiAN J. OF L. & Juus. 147
(1988).
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Feldman case in 1984,22 of its explicit application of conventional
strict liability principles to product warnings only two years ear-
lier, in the highly controversial Beshada opinion.23 The California
Supreme Court's similarly categorical rejection of strict tort liabil-
ity in warnings cases, in 198824 and 1991,25 certified the beginning
of the end for major chunks of strict liability doctrine in this area.
Many courts for many years undoubtedly will continue to apply
principles of strict liability to wild animals and extra-dangerous ac-
tivities, and many no doubt will continue to purport to apply
"strict" liability doctrine to products liability in the years ahead,
so that the "law" of strict liability should by no means be expected
to vanish quickly from the landscape. But the "strictness" in prod-
ucts liability doctrine has been stripped of much of its practical'
and moral27 force, and the trend toward its express abandonment
should be expected to continue.2 8
My thesis here is that the dominance of fault in the law of torts
is a moral inevitability. Fault lies at the very heart of tort law and
provides it with a meaningful, moral definition. The historical
truth of this thesis"9 is illustrated in Figure 2, the Fault Pit dia-
gram, below.30
22 Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (prescription drug warnings).
11 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (asbestos insulation
products warnings).
2' Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (prescription drug warnings).
2" Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991) (all warnings).
26 See generally Powers, Modest Proposal, supra note 21, at 640.
27 See generally Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 21; Owen, Principles of Justice,
supra note 21.
" This trend is especially likely to continue in design and warnings cases. See generally
Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 21.
2, "Historically, the principle of negligence succeeded in maintaining its centrality in
delictual liability, confining strict liability to specific areas." Izhak England, The Basis of
Tort Liability: Moral Responsibility and Social Utility in Tort Law, 10 TEL Aviv U. STUD.
IN L. 89, 97 (1990).
"0 Even more than Figure 1 above, The Fault Pit diagram in Figure 2 's intended only as






The solid curve in Figure 2 represents the Fault Pit, the domain
in law where responsibility for causing harm is defined by fault. It
is bordered on the top left side by principles of No Liability, where
actors whose blameworthy conduct causes harm to others are for
some reason protected from legal responsibility for that harm. On
the top right, the Fault Pit is bordered by principles of Strict Lia-
bility, sometimes referred to as "absolute" or "no-fault" liability.3 1
The dashed line inside the Fault Pit illustrates the progression of
liability over time-beginning with the explicit recognition of fault
as the proper basis of responsibility in accident law, in Brown v.
Kendall, 2 to the explicit repudiation of strict liability principles in
a major part of products liability law, and the reassertion of the
dominant role of fault, in Brown v. Superior Court.33
It is, of course, sheer coincidence that the explicit birth and re-
3 Gary Schwartz and others have distinguished "strict" from "absolute" liability, a dis-
tinction that is unnecessary for the rough No Liability-Fault--Strict Liability tripartite
model employed here.
60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
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birth of fault in the law of torts in America, an entire continent
and nearly a century and a half apart, occurred in both instances
in a case called Brown. The path between the two was long and
tortuous, and few would have had the foresight as late as 1978 to
predict that the California Supreme Court would certify a substan-
tial repudiation of the strict liability doctrine in products liability
law a mere ten years later. The sharp change in direction of liabil-
ity between 1978 and 1988 in the Fault Pit diagram illustrates the
virtual reversal of doctrine within this short span of years. Profes-
sor Schwartz well describes and explains many aspects of this de-
velopment in his article, and so I shall here only point out several
highlights of the law along the road into, through, and ultimately
back into the Great Pit of Fault.
As stated earlier, the journey begins in 1850 with Brown v.
Kendall, in which Chief Justice Shaw held that a man could not be
liable without fault for striking and injuring another accidently
while brandishing a stick in an attempt to separate fighting dogs.
Since proof of a defendant's fault had not been considered a neces-
sary element of the plaintiff's case before in Massachusetts, the
Brown decision propelled fault to center stage in accident litiga-
tion. Fault had not been irrelevant to liability prior to 1850, but its
doctrinal role generally was a secondary one, often shunted to the
rear in defensive pleas and camouflaged in arcane rules of plead-
ing. The older law thus should not be characterized as "no-fault"
or as "strict," for fault in some form lay within it.3 4 Instead, be-
cause of the many rules that prevented victims of accidental harm
from recovering against those who caused the harm, the regime
before 1850 may be better characterized by the notion of No Lia-
bility, 5 as discussed above. After 1850, other states followed
Brown in adopting fault or negligence as the rule of liability,30 and
by the time Holmes published The Common Law in 1881, negli-
gence had become the controlling principle of the law of
accidents.3
7
See generally supra text accompanying note 3 and sources cited therein.
See Rabin, supra note 13, at 935-45.
' It should be noted that a couple of states preceded Massachusetts in holding fault
necessary to tort liability. See, e.g., Harvey v. Dunlop, 1 Hill & Den. 193, 194 (N.Y. 1843);
Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 4 Raule 8, 25-26 (Pa. 1833).
37 See HOLMES, supra note 3, at 88-90.
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In 1916, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,38 Benjamin Cardozo
extended the reach of fault liability to manufacturers of defective
products; in 1928, in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,9 shortly
before he replaced Holmes on the Supreme Court, Cardozo framed
the outer boundary of liability in terms of a person's capacity to
control risk, confining responsibility to "the orbit of the danger as
disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance.' 40 In this manner, Pal-
sgraf provided further power to the role of fault in the law of acci-
dents by protecting actors from accountability in the law for harms
they could not foresee and, hence, in no way willed.'1 Palsgraf thus
may be seen as heralding the Golden Age of Fault, which lasted for
one-third of a century until the spell was broken by an opinion
from across the Hudson River in New Jersey.
The decision, authored by Justice Francis, was Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,42 and the year was 1960.4' The case was
not a torts case, strictly speaking, but one of warranty, involving
injuries from a defective car. But the New Jersey court treated the
case as if it had been labelled "tort," by stripping away the
Chrysler Motor Company's defenses based on contract-including
its reliance on a disclaimer and limitation, and on its absence of
privity with the victim. In allowing "strict liability" for breach of
"warranty," but denying the classic contract defenses, Henningsen
effectively adopted a principle of strict liability in "tort." So rea-
soned Justice Traynor for the California Supreme Court three
years later, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," and so
- 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
" 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
4o Id. at 100. "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed .. .
Id.
41 See the explanation of this point by the Privy Council, in Overseas Tankship (U.K.),
Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound 1), [1961] App. Cas. 388, 422-23, [1961] 1
All E.R. 404, 413 (P.C.):
[I]t does not seem consonant with current ideas of justice or morality that for
an act of negligence, however slight or venial, which results in some trivial fore-
seeable damage the actor should be liable for all consequences, however un-
foreseeable and however grave, so long as they can be said to be "direct." It is
a principle of civil liability ... that a man must be considered to be responsi-
ble for the probable consequences of his act. To demand more of him is too
harsh a rule ....
4-2 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
"3 The same year that produced the liberal presidency of John F. Kennedy.
44 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
1992]
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pronounced the American Law Institute, in section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, the following year.
The explosive spread of the principles of strict products liability
across the nation in the 1960s and the 1970s is chronicled in many
places 46 and need not be retold here. Despite some rumblings of
discontent from the first "crises" of products liability law and in-
surance in the late 1970s, 47 the permanence of strict products lia-
bility in tort seemed assured by 1980.48 This was the year Justice
Mosk of California spread the tentacles of no-fault products liabil-
ity for a single plaintiff's harm across an entire industry, where a
plaintiff was unable to identify the manufacturer of a suspect pre-
scription drug. The case was Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,4 and
the novel doctrine of causal attribution was "market share" liabil-
ity. The new doctrine seemed logical and fair, at least to some ex-
tent and in the abstract. Yet it threw not only fault but causation
to the winds, and the conversion of the doctrine's theory to the
realities of litigation promised to be rife with difficulty.5
The reach of strict products liability was expanding ever wider,
and so few were much surprised two years later when the New
Jersey court announced, in the asbestos case of Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp.,5 1 that its "strict liability" rule was truly
strict. The court there held that a product sold without warning of
a hidden danger was defective, subjecting its manufacturer to lia-
bility for resulting harm, regardless of the unforeseeability of the
The ALI adopted § 402A in 1964, and the section was officially promulgated with the
Restatement's publication in 1965.
" The classic early narrations are by Dean Prosser. See William L. Prosser, The Assault
upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAL. L.J. 1099 (1960); William L.
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966). For a more recent depiction, see, e.g., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note
15, at 158-88.
" See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 15, at 1012.
8 Even if still critiqued. See, e.g., Owen, Rethinking the Policies, supra note 21.
19 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
50 As well predicted by Professor Fischer. See David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An
Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981); see also Richard A. Ep-
stein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377, 1378-82 (1985); Keith C.
Miller & John D. Hancock, Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Reassess-
ment?, 88 W. VA. L. Rav. 81 (1985); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Failure to
Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 941
(1985).
51 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
[Vol. 26:703714
1FAUL T PIT
risk.52 The manufacturer, in other words, was proclaimed to have a
duty to warn of every danger, whether knowable or not, or pay the
consequences.
Beshada was the first products liability decision rendered by a
major court in which the outcome of the case explicitly depended
upon the principle of strict liability, where the manufacturer's to-
tal inability to foresee or guard against the danger was both alleged
and held to make no difference. The high-water mark of modern
strict liability law had been reached, and the commentators railed
against this nonsense.5s The New Jersey Court appears to have lis-
tened to the critical commentary and, remarkably, it entirely
changed its mind-a mere two years later, in Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories," a case involving a prescription drug, in which it all
but overruled Beshada.
Feldman marked the end of the rise of strict liability in warn-
ings cases, if not the beginning of its decline, as illustrated in the
Fault Pit diagram. Feldman defines the point at which the law
turns away from its lock-step march toward strict liability, back
toward principles of fault. Lest Feldman have been interpreted as
a fluke, the California Court certified its rectitude in another pre-
scription drug case in 1988, Brown v. Superior Court,"" and then
announced a broad rejection of strict liability in the product warn-
ing context three years later.8 6
The significance for the law of torts of Feldman and Brown, in
combination, cannot be overstated. Together they represent the re-
jection of the doctrine of strict liability in an important area of tort
law by the very two courts that had led the nation in the expansion
of tort liability during the 1960s and 1970s. It is principally for this
reason5 ' that the Fault Pit diagram shows the liability over time
112The risk was to workers of contracting asbestosis, mesothelioma, and other illnesses
from asbestos insulation products.
5Or "rubbish," in English English. Much of the most immediate railing occurred in a
symposium published by the New York University Law Review in 1983. See Symposium,
The Passage of Time: The Implications for Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L RLv. 734 (1983).
The Feldman decision itself cites several articles critical of Beshada. Feldman v. Lederle
Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984).
479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991) (asbestos).
11 Also during the 1980s, the decline of the strict products liability doctrine is similarly
observable, usually indirectly and less dramatically, in other judicial opinions and, often
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curve arching up and bending completely back, from 1982 to 1988,
into the direction of the Great Pit of Fault-where strict liability
has no place, and where moral and legal fault rule supreme.
II. A MORAL EXPLANATION FOR FAULT IN TORT LAW
In describing the dominant role of fault in tort law history, I
have so far postulated its propriety in moral theory. It remains in
this section for me to explain, partially and very briefly, how moral
philosophy supports, indeed demands, the primacy of fault in a
system of legal responsibility for accidental loss. Establishing this
general point will demonstrate two interrelated, subsidiary pro-
positions: (1) that persons should be legally responsible for their
faulty conduct that causes harm, to others or themselves; and (2)
that persons should not be legally responsible for causing harm in
the absence of personal moral fault.
Why should the law of torts be based on moral fault? Con-
versely, why should not the law instead place responsibility upon
persons "strictly" for merely causing harm? And why should not
the law have a rule of no liability for any accidental harm, leaving
all such losses where they fall? For answers to these questions one
may begin by examining why the law should care about accidental
harm at all, and what it may want to do about such harm. We may
look initially, in other words, at what the purposes of accident law
should be. 8
Accidents harm victims and society. By definition, an accident
diminishes the quality (and perhaps quantity) of a victim's life and
other goods, which produces suffering for the victim. We may as-
sume that human suffering is undesirable and so should be
avoided, ex ante, or remedied, ex post.5 9 Moreover, because acci-
dents consume human and other social resources, society suffers
more directly, in various "tort-reform" statutes.
"S For discussions of the goals of tort law, see PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note
15, ch.1; Thomas A. Cowan, The Victim of the Law of Torts: A Morality Play in Prologue
and Dialogue, 33 ILL. L. REV. 532 (1939); Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L.
REv. 72 (1942); Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEO. PROD, 137
(1951). For critiques of the conventional goals of tort law, see, e.g., Owen, Rethinking the
Policies, supra note 21; A Schwartz, Case Against Strict Liability, supra note 21; Stephen
D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558 (1985).
5" Unless the cost of such avoidance or remedy is, by some fair measure, excessive.
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harm to its aggregate stock of goods by accidents.60 Finally, if acci-
dental harm results from the actor's improper treatment of the vic-
tim, society's norms of proper interpersonal behavior are harmed
as well. There are thus good reasons why society should care about
accidental harm.
What, then, may the law choose to do about the problem of acci-
dental harm? If the law requires injurers to pay victims for their
losses, it may at once help relieve the suffering of victims, admon-
ish injurers, and discourage potential injurers from acting in a sim-
ilarly dangerous manner in the future. In conventional parlance,
the law in this way may serve two functions: (1) compensating in-
jury victims, and (2) punishing injurers. Punishing injurers tends
to achieve two subsidiary goals: (a) providing vindication to vic-
tims, and (b) deterring injurious conduct. These would appear to
be desirable goals which would seem to imply that the law should
adopt a rule of strict liability-a rule requiring injurers generally
to pay for accidental harm they cause.
Yet there is a fundamental problem here that involves the limits
to this principle: the law should not create more harm than cure. If
the goal of compensation is to relieve the victim's harm, compensa-
tion is plainly inappropriate when it causes even greater harm to
other persons-especially if there is some other, better way to alle-
viate the victim's economic burden.61 If the goal of punishment is
to vindicate and discourage improper harms, punishment is plainly
inappropriate when the harm at issue was instead quite proper, if
it was necessary to the creation of some greater good. Railroads,
automobiles, and pesticides by their nature sometimes cause ancil-
lary harm to persons, but many such dangerous things are neces-
sary to modern life. Dangerous products of this type may be made
or used improperly, causing improper accidental harm. But it is in
the nature of such dangerous things, unfortunately but inevitably,
that sometimes they will also cause "proper" accidental harm, de-
spite their having been made and used with all due care. The law
of torts should not punish the proper manufacture or use of such
items, and the compensation needs of accident victims resulting
from their proper manufacture and use are better handled by in-
'0 Unless the conduct that caused the accident generated more goods than it consumed.
" As by private insurance or public welfare mechanisms. See David G. Owen, Deterrence




As a rule of general operation, strict liability thus is bad because
it is far too blunt an instrument that operates far too broadly-not
only does it sometimes properly rectify and prevent wrongful
harm, but it also sometimes itself creates improper harm. Strict
liability thus suffers from being conceptually simplistic, inherently
unable to distinguish proper from wrongful harms, good conduct
from bad. It thus has no intrinsic moral value6 3 since it serves only
to shift monetary resources from injurers to victims. Such resource
shifting may as likely cause more suffering than it cures, and may
as likely waste more social resources than it saves. When the law so
operates without good reason, it is at best unnecessary and exces-
sive, and may well be an evil in itself.6 4
Strict liability therefore has no normative power as a legal in-
strument to help society with the central problems of distinguish-
ing between accidents that are acceptable from those that are not,
or of determining how to handle accidents of the unacceptable va-
riety. This is where moral philosophy, and notions of wrongfulness,
moral fault, and desert, can help. While causation and damage of
course are necessary to responsibility for harm, the central issue is
not whether an actor caused harm, but whether he caused wrong-
ful harm.6 5 By definition, a person is morally to blame, "at fault,"
62 Through private, first-party health and disability insurance, and by public welfare pro-
grams. See Owen, supra note 61.
" Despite its intrinsic moral failure as a rule of general applicability, strict liability serves
a useful role in certain narrow contexts where the excessive nature of the risk to victim
rights is clear. Among the few paradigms of this type are harms from wild animals and
harms from manufacturing flaws in products. On the latter point, see Owen, Moral Founda-
tions, supra note 21.
11 HOLMES, supra note 3, at 96. "Law would be reduced to tyranny, and its purposes de-
prived of a vital dimension, if it were viewed one dimensionally as a good. . . . [L]ike most
everything known to man, [it] is an evil in excess." David G. Owen, Respect for Law and
Man: The Tort Law of Chief Justice Frank Rowe Kenison, 11 VT. L. REV. 389, 407 (1986).
65 This essential point is elemental to the notion of corrective justice. See generally Er-
nest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992); Richard Wright,
Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992). And the point is funda-
mental in the law of torts:
At common law, tort liability has primarily been grounded not on the notion
that the defendant by his mere act or omission has caused harm to the plain-
tiff, but rather on the notion that the defendant by his wrongful act or omis-
sion has caused harm to the plaintiff. The root idea of tort law is that the
defendant must be "in the wrong," "at fault," "unjustified," "blameworthy," or
"culpable" for liability to attach to his conduct.
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for causing wrongful harm. Conversely, a person is free from
blame, "faultless," for causing only proper harm.68 How, then, may
the law determine whether harm has been caused "wrong-
fully"--or, instead, "properly"-by an actor?
The answer to this question requires an inquiry into the moral
character of human action, which begins with the concept of free-
dom. Freedom, or "autonomy," is "the supreme principle of moral-
ity."'67 Based upon the premise of free will, the freedom ideal en-
tails the notion that human dignity and morality derive from the
ability of each person rationally to make choices among alterna-
tives in the pursuit of goals selected by the individual.68 Because
persons are by nature free, their choices may be good or bad, which
generates the notion of moral responsibility-moral accountability
for the propriety of such choices. Thus, from freedom and respon-
sibility springs the notion of desert, both positive and negative:
persons deserve praise (credit) for making choices that are good,
and blame (discredit) for making choices that are bad. This means
that human behavior (and resulting consequences), and a person's
choices that underlie behavior, may be judged against a moral
standard.
If tort. law is to have a moral center, as I believe it does and
must, then it should first and foremost reflect, protect, and pro-
mote human freedom, to the extent that it is able to do so without
undue cost. When both the causes and effects of a person's choices
are largely internal to that person, as a decision to eat a sandwich
rather than read a book, there ordinarily is no occasion for the law
to concern itself with the moral quality of the choice. Yet when a
person's choices involve harm to others, interfeiing with the ability
of those other persons to exercise their own wills free from outside
interference, the law has an important role to play in defining and
enforcing the boundaries between personal freedom of action and
Snow v. City of Columbia, 409 S.E.2d 797, 799 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (Bell, J.).
" But see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973);
Tony Honor6, Responsibility and Luck: The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104 LQ. REv.
530 (1988).
67 ImasNUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS "440 (L. Beck trans.,
1959) (1785).
" "Autonomy is thus the basis of the dignity of both human nature and every rational
nature." Id. at *436; see also id. at *452-53. "The will is free, so that freedom is both the




personal security from harm. So tort law properly may hold a doc-
tor responsible for a detrimental result, flowing from a calculated
risk inherent in a particular surgical procedure, if the doctor fails
to obtain the patient's informed consent before the operation. 9 So,
too, tort law may properly hold a person accountable for choosing
to act in a manner that is likely to bring injury upon himself, as by
running into a busy street. ° Yet, fundamental as the freedom ideal
surely is, in many cases it is an insufficient guide in itself for deter-
mining moral accountability for accidental harm.
Probably the most enduring ethic for helping freedom sort out
the moral implications of collisions between autonomous persons,
each of whom at the time was pursuing his own objectives, is the
ideal of equality. The central importance of equality within a sys-
tem of law and ethics is traceable to Aristotle, for whom equality
provided the substantive core of the concept of "corrective jus-
tice." 17 Equality was also central to the justice system of Immanuel
Kant,72 the father of modern liberal philosophy. And it is a central
value within the justice constructs of a number of leading modern
legal philosophers, notably Rawls73 and Dworkin.
74
Equality as a social ideal may be defined in many ways, but
within a free society may perhaps best be defined "weakly" as re-
quiring an "equality of concern and respect" for the interests of
other persons.75 By this standard, the moral character of a person's
9 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 189-92.
70 See generally id. § 68 (assumption of risk).
7' [Tihe law. . . treats the parties as equal, and asks only if one is the author and
the other the victim of injustice or if the one inflicted and the other has sus-
tained an injury. Injustice then in this sense is unfair or unequal, and the en-
deavor of the judge is to equalize it ....
ARISTOTLE, THE NiCOMACHEAN ETHICS 154 (J. Welldon trans., 1987); see generally sources
cited supra note 65.
72 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (RECHTSLEHRE) *231-38
(J. Ladd trans., 1965) (1797).
73 Rawls's first principle of justice provides: "[E]ach person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971).
7, RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 295-301 (1986); see Enic RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE
(1991). John Finnis considers equality one of three elements embraced in the concept of.
justice. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 161-64 (1980).
71 See RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 182 (1977) (noting that Rawls's
"justice as fairness rests on an assumption of a natural right of all men and women to an
equality of concern and respect [possessed] simply as human beings with the capacity to
make plans and give justice").
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choice to act in a manner causing harm to another person is depen-
dent upon whether the actor accorded equal concern and respect
to the other's interests at the time of choice and action. Such re-
spect requires, first, that actors properly regard the vested "prop-
erty" (and other established) rights of other persons, just as actors
would want others to respect their own possession of such rights.
Both the law of crimes and torts thus protects persons against the
theft of a book and against an unprovoked punch in the nose. By
according protection to such established rights, the law provides
each person with a fundamental groundwork of security in one's
person and property. This security permits persons to go about the
business of life, pursuing their various personal goals, without hav-
ing to invest substantially-financially or emotionally-in constant
and vigilant self-protection against such thefts of their established
rights.
Accidents, however, ordinarily cannot be viewed usefully as
"takings" of such established "rights," demanding compensation."
The general application of this form of "taking" perspective to
every accident case would amount to a rule of strict liability, which
is unacceptable as explained above. Instead, when an actor's choice
of action involves only a risk of harm to others, necessary and inci-
dental to the pursuit of some proper goal not harmful in itself,
then the moral character of the action depends on an evaluation of
the relative worth of the affected interests77-- principally of the ac-
tor and the victim but also of other persons. If an act is likely to
achieve a good for the actor and others that is greater than any
harm foreseeably risked to the victim and others, then it is morally
justifiable in terms of equality, and vice versa.7 8 Not only is this
form of risk-benefit analysis for evaluating risky conduct sup-
ported by the ideal of equality, and hence by freedom, but it is also
supported by utility. That is, this approach to responsibility for
harm measures the moral quality of an act by the extent to which
the act is calculated to advance the aggregate (net) welfare of ev-
71 Why the "taking" paradigm, useful in the intentional tort context, is unhelpful in ana-
lyzing accident cases is a difficult problem that lies at the heart of the moral foundations of
tort law. See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 21, at 19-36, 52-55.
7 And on the likelihood that, and the degree to which, such interests may be affected by
the action.
" Assuming that the victim has no special right against such risks, arising for example




Learned Hand embraced this kind of calculus-of-risk approach
for judging the quality of choices in the celebrated B < P x L
formula for negligence described in United States v. Carroll Tow-
ing Co.8 0 The Hand formula is often perceived as providing an eco-
nomic model of negligence law,81 and to a large extent it does.
More important to moral theory, however, is that interest balanc-
ing of this sort requires actors to accord the interests of other per-
sons equal consideration to their own,8 2 and that conduct that
seeks to maximize society's scarce resources, and to minimize
waste, generally advances social welfare.
Equality and utility, therefore, support a definition of fault in
terms of a calculus of risks and benefits. Because this method for
determining moral and legal responsibility for accidental harm can
accommodate the particular interests of all concerned-actors, vic-
tims, and other affected persons-it is rich enough to integrate the
variety of considerations ordinarily involved in such determina-
tions. As helpful as it is, however, if aggregate interest balancing of
this type were used as the primary definition of liability for acci-
dental harm, it could be faulted for denying value to important
individual rights of the parties to an accident. For this reason, risk-
benefit analysis generally should be resorted to only as a "default
rule,""3 for use when a freedom and vested rights analysis fails to
provide an adequate resolution of a dispute. Even in such a default
role, however, risk-utility principles are powerful tools for deter-
mining responsibility. Principles of freedom and vested rights
alone frequently are unable to resolve the complex questions of ac-
countability in such cases, as discussed above, and risk-benefit
11 For accounts of utilitarianism in its classical form, see JEREMY BENTHAM. AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARI-
ANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1863). For a helpful comparison of util-
ity and equality in the context of accident law, see DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 288-301.
80 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)(expressing the concept, in algebraic terms, as negli-
gence being implied if B < PL, where B is the burden or cost of avoiding accidental loss, P
is the increase in probability of loss if B is not undertaken, and L is the probable magnitude
or cost of such loss). Hand first employed this approach in Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611
(2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
" Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
82 By acting in a manner that respects the interests of others, or by paying for harm
caused by denying the equality of others.
'3 See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 21.
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analysis often provides the most helpful guide for determining
moral and legal responsibility for accidental harm.
In the final analysis, however, whether the law of torts turns to
freedom, vested rights, equality, or utility as the primary determi-
nant of responsibility for harm, it rests at bottom on principles of
moral fault.
CONCLUSION
Fault defines the center of the law of wrongful harms. This im-
portant fact is demonstrated by the dominant role of fault in the
history of tort law in this nation, particularly by tort law's dra-
matic return of fault in the last decade. The Great Strict Liability
Experiment in products liability has mostly proved a failure, and
its continuing decline, although sometimes wavering, appears
inevitable.
The failure of a broad principle of strict liability, and the resto-
ration of fault to its natural position at the heart of the law of
torts, was morally inevitable. The ideals of freedom and equality
require that the interests of actors and other persons be accorded
an equal dignity to those of accident victims. This implies, first,
that actors must respect the established rights of other persons.
Yet when the interests of other persons do not have such prior
value," then actors are morally to blame, and should be legally ac-
countable, only for causing "improper" accidental harm, that is,
foreseeable harm that reasonably appeared "excessive" when com-
pared to the reasonably expectable benefits to the actor and other
persons.
When persons suffer accidental harm incident to proper conduct,
conduct that reflects due respect for the prior rights of potential
victims and that appears on balance likely to cause more good than
harm, the law of torts has no proper role to play.85 Persons may
protect themselves by insuring against the economic consequences
of such "unavoidable" risks of harm-whether unforeseeable or
necessary for the greater social good-and government may other-
wise protect those who are unable to insure themselves. But tort
law concerns the law of "wrongs," not insurance, and thus should
generally seek to rectify harm resulting only from individual moral
84 Or when they are trivial or incommensurable.
Except to declare the propriety of such conduct.
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fault.
Lying at the center of the law of torts is the Great Pit of Fault, a
kind of legal inferno, into which moral miscreants are thrown kick-
ing and screaming to their certain doom. Yet the Fault Pit con-
tains much more than darkness and despair, for it is lined not with
recrimination but with moral rectitude. Finding its source deep
within philosophical values, moral and political, the Fault Pit gen-
erates a wellspring of ethical bounty, providing a touchstone of
propriety-based upon human freedom, individual responsibility,
equality of respect, and social utility-to guide all persons in their
actions affecting others.
